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which the spirit of the Wagner Act demands.' 8 Either abrogation or substitution is
preferable to the strict enforcement of contracts where there has been a change of affiliation.
Oil and Gas-Applicability of Rule against Perpetuities to Grant of Oil and Gas[Federal].-In 19o the defendants' predecessor in title conveyed and warranted to
the plaintiffs' predecessor in interest "all the coal, oil, and gas in and under" certain
premises, together with the right to "take and use so much of the surface of said lands
as the grantee" might deem necessary or convenient for the production of the coal,
oil, and gas, provided, however, that "all the land the surface of which is so taken
shall be paid for when so taken at the rate of $5o per acre.?' After the co-defendant
lessees discovered oil and gas on the premises in 1941, the plaintiffs claimed ownership of these minerals and sought to enjoin the defendants from interfering with their
possession and development. The defendants insisted that the provision in the deed
respecting the acquisition of surface area violated the rule against perpetuities, and
by counter-claim sought to quiet their alleged title to the oil and gas. Held, that the
provision for payment did not violate the rule against perpetuities. Chicago, Wilmington & Franklin Coal Co. v. Herr.'
The defendants argued that the deed gave the plaintiffs only an option to acquire
the use' of surface areas to be designated at an indefinite time in the future and contended that this option was void since an option in gross of unlimited duration violates
the rule against perpetuities.3 However, the court felt itself bound by the case of
Threlkeld v. Inglett.4 In that case the Supreme Court of Illinois held that all the means
necessary to produce oil and gas pass with a grant of these minerals even without any
express provisions in the deed to that effect;s one of these means was the right to use
18 Restriction of the life of a contract to a one-year term has been suggested as the most
workable mean between undesirable "freezing" and desirable "reasonable stability" of representation. The establishment of a continuous administrative process would permit the adjustment of contract rights according to the requirements of each case. Legislative promulgation of standard agreements would remove the whole problem from control by union contract.
Change of Bargaining Representative during the Life of an Agreement under the Wagner Act,
51 Yale L.J. 465, 481 (1942). If the contracts were to be limited to one year, with a new election to be held after that period, therewould no doubt have to be legislation governing the
behavior of any growing minority group during that time so that its opportunity for growth
might be impeded no more than is required by the legitimate interests of the union holding the
present contract. Judicial attacks on this problem have not, as yet, been too felicitous. See
Cohen, The Minority Union's Right to Strike, x6 Ind. L.J. 377 (1941).
'40

F. Supp. 311 (Ill. 1941).

That the deed is to be interpreted as providing for the use rather than the fee in such
areas is indicated by the phraseology of the clause in question, viz., "the right to take and
use so much of the surface .......
3London & Southwestern R. Co. v. Gomm, 2o Ch. Div. 562 (C. A. 1882); Lewis Oyster
2

Co. v. West, 93 Conn. 518, ,07 At!. 138 (igi8); Barton v. Thaw, 41 Pa. Co. Ct. 396 (1913);
Starcher v. Duty, 61 W.Va. 373, 56 S.E. 524 (1907); Winsor v. Mills, I57 Mass. 362, 32 N.E.
352 (1892); cf. Keogh v. Peck, 36 Ill. 3x8, 147 N.E. 266 (1925).
4 289 Ill. 90, 97, 124 N.E. 368, 371 (,919).
s See Glassmire, Oil and Gas Leases and Royalties 135 n. 129 (2d ed. 1938).
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the surface to any degree necessary for production; this right was already vested rethe
rule
gardless of any provision for payment; hence,, there could be no violation of
against perpetuities.
Even admitting the correctness of the court's position that payment was not a condition precedent, the question still remains as to whether these implied "rights" are
really vested as the courts in the Threlkeld case and the instant case apparently assumed. Although the court failed to consider the exact nature of the surface rights it
was dealing with, the grantee would ultimately secure what may be described as a
series of easements 7 in various parts of the surface. Since easements are subject to the
rule against perpetuities, 8 the question arises whether these easements will vest
within the period of the rule. In considering this question it should be noted that
there are two uncertainties aside from payment to which the acquisition of the easements is subject. The first is as to when productive needs will require a particular easement; the second is as to where productive needs will require a particular easement.
Although no decision has been found in which a court knowingly sustained an interest in property where neither the subject matter nor the time of vesting could be
ascertained with certainty within the period of the rule against perpetuities, there exists one theory upon which the decision in the instant case might be sustained. It
might be argued that the grantee secured an easement in the whole surface of the
tract, an ascertained subject matter, and that the sections which are later actually
9
to be used will be subdivisions of the original easement. This approach is subject to
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"Vested" is used here in the sense of not being subject to any condition precedent. Cf.

Leach, Cases and Materials on Future Interests 259-60 (i935). By implication the court

seems to hold that payment is a condition subsequent.' Indeed, the courts in Illinois have gone
far in holding conditions to be subsequent or else charges upon the land. Cronin v. Cronin
314 Ill. 345, 145 N.E. 6rg (1924); Spangler v. Newman, 239 Ill. 616, 88 N.E. 202 (1909);
lratz v. Kratz, I89 Ill. 276, 59 N.E. 519 (i9ox); Parsons v. MilIar, 189 Il. 107, 59 N.E. 6o6
('go').
7 The interest of the grantee under an oil and gas deed might be characterized as a "license
coupled with an interest." 3 Tiffany, Real Property § 835 (3d ed. 1939). Licenses have never
been subject to the rule against perpetuities. But by the decisions of the Illinois court a grant
of oil and gas "passes nothing." Watford Oil & Gas Co. v. Shipman, 233 il. 9, 84 N.E. 53
(r9o8); Triger v. Carter Oil Co., 372 Ill. 182, 23 N.E. (2d) 55 (1939). Therefore there is no
interest to which the "license" could be "coupled" unless it be the "power" to reduce the
oil and gas to possession. See Hohfeld, Faulty Analysis in Easement and License Cases,
27 Yale L. J. 66 (1917). The distinction between easements and licenses is often vague. Ibid.
The Oklahoma court has characterized the interest in question as an easement. Newbern v.
Gould, 162 Okla. 82, 19 P. (2d) 157 (1933); Morgan v. McGee, 117 Okla. 212, 245 Pac. 888
(1926); see Glassmire, Oil and Gas Leases and Royalties § 39 (2d ed. 1938).
8 Gray, Rule against Perpetuities §§ 314-i6 (3d ed. 1915); 2 Simes, Law of Future Interests § 5o9 (i936).

9 The analogy of a profit . prendre immediately suggests itself here. However, the parties
did not express themselves in "profit" language. Nor has the Illinois court, although it has had
many opportunities to do so, declared the interest created under an oil and gas instrument to
be a profit. Cf. 3 Tiffany, Real Property 431 n. 25 (3d ed. 1939).
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should become subject to an easement, and that the remainder should continue in its
former use.
Although, because of the peculiar character of the interests granted in the instant
case, it is difficult to categorize them in any precise way, there seem to be at least two
other constructions, more consistent with the intent of the parties, which could be
made as to their nature. First, the provisions, express or implied, regarding the acquisition of surface area might be likened to a conditional limitation that the grantee
"shall have the use of those parts of my land upon which he discovers oil." There is
little doubt but that this limitation is too remote. Second, the deed might be construed
upon closer analysis as giving the grantee a power 0 to create easements in the surface for his own benefit at any time in the future when production requires.x Since
the power may be exercised at a remote time in the future, it violates the rule against
perpetuities.12
Assuming that the provision in the instant case does violate the rule against perpetuities, the question remains whether the burden placed upon the premises is onerous
enough to warrant the application of the rule as a matter of policy. Certainly, if the
grantee may create easements in the surface at any time in the future, and fill these
areas with derricks, pipelines, and storage tanks, the owner of the surface may well
be hesitant about making substantial improvements upon the premises. Furthermore,
the grantee's outstanding interest will tend to prevent the premises from ever being
used for residential, industrial, or commercial purposes, with a consequent reduction
in value and alienability. Therefore, it would seem that the burden upon the premises
is substantial.
It may be argued, nevertheless, that provisions permitting the acquisition of needed
surface area by the grantee of oil and gas should be excepted from the operation of the
rule against perpetuities. In the first place a grant of oil and gas is valuable only so
long as the surface area may be used; thus the surface provisions enhance rather than
depreciate the value of the grant. Similar considerations in the case of covenants for
the perpetual renewal of leases and options to purchase appendant to long term leases
have influenced the courts to declare these instruments exceptions to the rule against
10 While what the grantee has is not a power in the usual sense of a power of appointment,
or a power of sale, yet he does have a power in the broader sense that he is able to change
legal relations in a piece of land. See Continental Clay Co. v. Illinois Kaolin Co., 232 Ill.
App. 596, 607 (1920). For a similar power in respect to profits . prendre, see Hohfeld, Faulty
Analysis in Easement and License Cases, 27 Yale L. J. 66, 70 n. 9, 97 et seq. (1917); Clark,
Real Covenants 26 (X929). In general, see Corbin, Legal Analysis and Terminology, 29 Yale
LJ. 163, 168 (I919); 2 Simes, Law of Future Interests §§ 534 et seq. (x936); Gray, Rule against
Perpetuities §§ 473 et seq. (3 d ed. igi5); Sugden, Powers 107 (3 d Am. ed. i856). It would
seem that the "power" analysis is more accurate than the "conditiondl limitation" analysis
since the grantee has a certain amount of discretion as to time and place in the creation of the
easement, dependent of course on the concurrence of the conditions of productive necessity.
" The easements in the instant case are to be distinguished from a way of necessity. In
the latter, the grantor of the isolated property may himself designate the way of necessity in
the event that the grantee does not do so. 3 Tiffany, Real Property § 804 (3 d ed. 1939), and
cases there cited.
12 Gray, Rule against Perpetuities § 473 (3d ed. 1915).
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perpetuities.3 Even though these covenants and options may operate beyond the period of the rule, they enhance the value of the leasehold estate and render it profitable
for the lessee to make improvements.
A second reason for excepting the provision for use of surface areas in grants of oil
and gas from operation of the rule grows out of the business background of these transactions. They are entirely unrelated to family settlements, to which the rule against
perpetuities is ordinarily applied.
Third, in the ordinary case where production has begun, the burden imposed upon
the premises will not in fact extend beyond the period of the rule, since the average
oil field is exhausted within twenty years."4 Hence, as long as exploration and development are begun promptly, there is little likelihood of easements being created beyond
the period allowed by the rule. The possibility that the grantee may delay production
after discovery of the oil and gas is negligible, since he must either produce at the same
rate as his neighbors or lose the larger part of the oil beneath the premises through
drainage by wells on adjoining property.
If the grantee does not begin operations within a reasonable time, however, or if a
second oil horizon is discovered beneath the same premises long after the original
horizon has been exhausted, it would seem that a remedy more appropriate in this
commercial situation than the application of the rule against perpetuities would be to
infer an intent to abandon the entire grant from failure to develop within a reasonable
time.'s But however desirable this solution may seem from a practical standpoint, it
will encounter the difficulty that incorporeal rights like those involved in the instant
case 6 can not ordinarily be lost by non-user alone,17 since non-user is held to be insufficient evidence of an intent to abandon. In an attempt to prove there was no intention
to abandon, it migrit be argued that failure to develop is no more than non-user. In
the case of oil and gas leases, however, non-user, or failure to enter and develop, is almost everywhere held to constitute abandonment. 8 These holdings are based mainly
' 2 Simes, Law of Future Interests §§ 511-12 (1936), and cases there cited; Carey and
Schuyler, Illinois Law of Future Interests §492 (i94i); cf. Keogh v. Peck, 310 Ill. 318, 147
N.E. 266 (1925).
X4The average period of economic production of an oil well or oil field would seem to range
from ten to twenty years. Cutler, Estimation of Underground Oil Reserves by Oil Well Production Curves (U.S. Bureau of Mines, Bull. 228, 1924); Beal, The Decline and Ultimate
Production of Oil Wells (U.S. Bureau of Mines, Bull. 177, 1919).
ISSee 9 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 345 (1942), noting Chicago, Wilmington & Franklin Coal Co. v.
Minier, 40 F. Supp. 316 (I1M.1941).
16 Note x5 supra.
17 3 Tiffany, Real Property § 825 (3 d ed. 1939), and cases there cited. But non-user for the
prescriptive period has occasionally been regarded as creating a rebuttable presumption of
an intent to abandon. Hunter v. West, 172 N.C. i6o, 9o S.E. i3o (ig6); Pratt v. Sweetser,
68 Me. 344 (1878); Dyer v. Depui, 5 Whart. (Pa.) 584 (i84o).
is In Boatman v. Andre, 44 Wyo. 352, 12 P. (2d) 370 (1932), the court, in declaring a
lease abandoned where the lessee had never entered the premises, said ". ... abandonment
will be more readily found in cases of oil and gas leases than in most other instances." In Clark
v. Wright, 311 Pa. 69, i66 Atl. 775 (1933), the court said that unexplained failure to develop
"gives rise to a fair presumption of abandonment .... and, standing alone and admitted,
would justify the court in declaring an abandonment .... as a matter of law." In Martin
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on the theory that the lessor's royalty interest must be protected, with a corollary to
the effect that it was not the expectation of the parties that the lessee would permit
the land to lie dormant with the lease as a perpetual cloud on the title.19 Although
there is no private royalty interest at stake under the grant in the instant case, it
would seem that there remains a public interest which corresponds to the royalty
owner's interest, in that it is to the public's advantage to have petroleum resources
proved up and developed. This interest should be no more subject to the grantee's
inertia that the royalty owner's interest should be subject to the lessee's inertia.
Furthermore, in the case of grants of standing timber, where the grantor has no royalty
interest, courts uniformly hold that unless the timber be removed in a reasonable time,
the grantee's rights in the timber are extinguished.20 This same rule should be applied
to grants of oil and gas.
Patents-Extent of Use of Patent-Use of Tying Agreement Bars Patentee in Infringement Suit-[Federal].-The plaintiff company leased its patented salt-depositing.machines to commercial canners on the condition that they use with these machines only salt tablets, which were unpatented, made by the plaintiff's subsidiary.
The defendant company, which also manufactured unpatented salt tablets, made unpatented depositing machines and leased them to canners. The plaintiff alleged that
the defendant's machine infringed its patent, and brought suit for an injunction and
v. Consolidated Coal & Oil Corp., ioi W.Va. 721, 133 S.E. 626 (1926), the court quoted
Archer, Law and Practice in Oil and Gas Cases § 28 (191o): "Where a lessee under an oil and
gas lease has not within a reasonable time entered upon the demised premises for the purpose
of exploring for oil and gas, the law presumes an abandonment." Hift v. Henderson, 112
Okla. 194, 240 Pac. 745 (1925); New State Oil & Gas. Co. v. Dunn, 75 Okla. 141, 182 Pac.
514 (1919); Cole v. Butler, io3 Kan. 419, x73 Pac. 978 (I918); Mills v. Hartz, 77 Kan. 218,
94 Pac. 142 (I9o8); Mansfield Gas Co. v. Parkhill, ii 4 Ark. 419, i69 S.W. 957 (1914); Mansfield Gas Co. v. Alexander, 97 Ark. 167, 133 S.W. 837 (1911); Barnhart v. Lockwood, 152 Pa.
82, 25 Atl. 237 (1892); Kentucky Rock Asphalt Co. v. Milliner, 234 Ky. 217, 27'S.W. (2d)

937 (,930). In Louisiana, a grant or reservation of oil and gas if not exercised for ten years
is lost. See Louisiana Civil Code (Dart, 1942) art. 123.118; Achee v, Caillouett, 197 La. 313,
x S. (2d) 530 (i94i); Palmer Corp. v. Moore, 171 La. 774, 132 So. 229 (1930). In Texas, even

corporeal estates in oil and gas are terminable by abandonment. Stephens County v. MidKansas Oil & Gas Co., 113 Tex. i6o, 254 S.W. 290 (1923); Texas Co. v. Davis, 113 Tex. 321,
255 S.W. 6ox (1923); see 3 Summers, Oil and Gas § 459, at 78-80 (perm. ed. 1938). Illinois

courts recognize the principle of abandonment, although no case has been found in which a
lease was actually declared abandoned. See Ohio Oil Co. v. Reichert, 343 Ill. 56o, 566, 175
N.E. 790, 793 (1931); Gillespie v. Ohio Oil Co., 260 Ill. 169, 102 N.E. 1o43 (1913)"
19 3 Summers, Oil and Gas §§ 453, 459 (perm. ed. 1938).
2o Couch v. Kahler Co., 199 Ark. 45, 132 S.W. (2d) 648 (i939); Moxley v. Adams, i9o
Ga. 164, 8 S.E. (2d) 525 (194o); Wilson Cypress Co. v. Stevens, io6 Fla. 7,7, 143 So. 661
(1932); Parsons v. Boggie, 139 Ore. 469, Xi P. (2d) 280 (1932); Nelson v. McKinney, 163

Wash. 529, 1 P. (2d) 876 (i93i); Altizer v. Jewell Ridge Coal Corp., 157 Va. i, i6o S.E. 47
(i93i); Joyce v. Gibson, io6 W.Va. 221, 145 S.E. 279 (1928); Rathborne, Hair & Ridgway
Co. v. Coffron, 173 Minn. 452, 217 N.W. 5o (1928); Eastern Kentucky Mineral & Timber
Co. v. Swann-Day Lumber Co., 148 Ky. 82, 146 S.W. 438 (1912); Carson v. Lumber Co.,
io8 Tenn. 681, 69 S.W. 320 (1902); cf. Gay Mfg. Co. v. Hobbs, 128 N.C. (46), 38 S.E. 26
(I90I).

